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"Legal Memoranda" is a regular section of the Review devot-
ed to reports from corresponding law firms throughout the Hemi-
sphere. The reports are compiled by the Review, but their accura-
cy is represented by the corresponding firms, to which all inqui-
ries should be directed.
We appreciate the contributions of the corresponding law
firms and invite other firms interested in participating in this
section to contact us.
COLOMBIA
CASE OF TRADEMARK OFERTA: SENTENCE OF OCTOBER
23, 1989
1. ORIGIN OF THE SENTENCE
The Council of State requested a prejudicial interpretation
from the Andean Court of Justice in the nullity proceeding
against the writ from the Division of Distinctive Signs, whereby
registration of trademark OFERTA was granted. Said trade-
mark was registered in favor of corporation "Papeles Suaves de
Colombia," to distinguish products under class 16 of Decree 755
of 1972. The nullity action was instituted by the corporation
"Productos Gamilia S.A," "claiming that OFERTA(1) is a generic
expression and that, therefore, its registration as trademark
infringes the provisions of Decision 85 of the Cartagena Agree-
ment regarding this matter."
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2. PROVISIONS REQUESTED To BE INTERPRETED
The Council of State requested prejudicial interpretation of
the following articles of Decision 85 of the Commission of the
Cartagena Agreement: 56, 57, 58(a) and (c), 62, 64, and 84. The
Andean Court of Justice, however, refrained from offering "spe-
cial difficulty in their application to this proceeding."
3. ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE COURT
In this Sentence, the Court referred to two essential themes
related to trademarks: generic denominations and ambiguous
terms.
a. Generic Denominations
The court begins making an analysis of what, according to
grammar, can be understood as generic denominations. In this
regard, it states as follows:
According to the Dictionary of the 'Real Academia de la
Lengua,' GENERIC is 'what is common to several species,'
and GENDER is 'a grouping of beings with one or more com-
mon attributes.' SPECIES, on the other hand, is 'a group of
things similar to each other because they have one or more
common attributes.' "Generic denomination" or "common
noun," as Mr. Andreas Bello refers to it in his Gramatica de
la Lengua Castellana (2), applies to 'all individuals in a class,
species or family, meaning their nature or the qualities they
have.' Mr. Miguel Antonio Caro, in his turn, states that a
generic denomination, 'being common to several individuals,
does not belong to anybody."
Then, the court went on from the grammatical to the juridical
field and states why, although there are denominations that
could be understood juridically. In this respect, it expresses:
"Thus, in connection to trademarks a denomination is not neces-
1. Manuel Pachon in the "Manual de Propiedad Industrial," Temis Ed., 1984
pg. 101 and 102.) (1) Note. The word OFERTA in Spanish ("offer" in English) means




sarily generic just because it is so in the grammatical sense. The
generic character of a common noun, which renders it juridically
impeded to be used as a trademark, results only if such denomi-
nation can be used on its own, according to the language nor-
mally used in commerce, to show or identify the class of the
product in question. For this reason, doctrine has specified that
a generic denomination is so when the answer to the question
"what is it?," regarding a product or service, is a generic denomi-
nation. Thus, the terms 'chair,' 'furniture,' 'pill,' and 'paper' are
generic in relation to such classes of products."
This is how the court adopts a doctrine traditionally accept-
ed in relation to trademarks, according to which a denomination
that can be classified as 'fanciful' and that is therefore capable
to constitute a trademark, may be grammatically generic, but
not in juridical terms.
The rationale for this provision is the defense of freedom of
industry and trade, which seeks to avoid the creation of unlaw-
ful monopolies over expressions that everybody has the right to
use. It was so understood by the Court, since it expressed the
following:
Instead, from the Trademark Law point of view a term is
rendered generic when the entrepreneurs of the relevant eco-
nomic sector have to use it in some way to show the product
or service, or when the term can identify it by itself. In such
cases, as it has been stated, it would not only be acceptable
for only one entrepreneur to try to appropriate something
that is common, and that other entrepreneurs might need to
refer to their product or service, using the regular language.
b. Ambiguous terms
It is at this point that the Court brings about an innovation
regarding the trademark law. Indeed, although it begins ex-
plaining why the work of OFERTA is not generic, it further
states:
But it happens that any product or service in the market -
including all kinds of paper, of course - although not nec-
essarily "on sale" is certainly offered. It means that, despite
that the term could be physically distinctive, it could lead to
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confusion from the functional point of view, what is most im-
portant to the trademark law. This would also be the case of
other generic and ambiguous terms which, metaphorically,
could show certain individuality that could make them, in
principle, suitable as trademarks, but that could lead inev-
itably to confusion when used as common nouns or verbs and,
therefore, applicable to all kinds of products and services.
This would be the case, for instance, of 'demand,' 'service,'
'sale,' bargain,' 'second-hand goods,' etc.
Thus the Court offers a new notion regarding expressions
that cannot be registered as trademarks, and it is that of ambig-
uous terms in commercial language. In this respect, the Court
states:
In summary, terms as those mentioned, although in theory
could be new in their concrete relation with a product they,
could become misleading or ambiguous within the language
normally used in commerce. If this is so, they would be ac-
ceptable as trademarks, according to the provisions of Deci-
sion 85, mentioned above.
This second part of the Sentence is completely new. When read-
ing the studies on trademarks made by experts, the reader finds
a list of the signs that are registerable as trademarks, and an-
other one with signs that are not. Among the latter, notions
such as "generic denominations," "names of common use," "modi-
fying adjectives," "unlawful signs" and "misleading signs" are
found.
However, when trying to locate the ambiguous terms the
Court refers to, it can be observed that they do not correspond to
any of those already mentioned. Terms such as demand or offer
cannot be classified as unlawful, nor as generic, nor as of com-
mon use, as the Court has determined. It is not with adjectives
but with nouns that modifying adjectives are discarded. Finally,
they cannot be branded as misleading signs, since expressions as
those mentioned in the Sentence do not seek to attribute quali-
ties, origin or nature to the product or service other than the
real ones.
When the Court mentions terms that are "misleading and
ambiguous in the language usually used in commerce," it is un-
doubtedly establishing that, although all signs or fanciful de-
nominations are, in principle, capable of being trademarks, there
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are some terms that under no circumstances can be trademarks
under any class of the nomenclature, and the Court calls them
ambiguous terms used in commerce.
Although this jurisprudence is new, it works against the
Andean trademark juridical order, for article 58 of Decision 85
establishes which signs cannot be registered as trademarks, and
these ambiguous terms are not mentioned.
The ambiguous terms mentioned by the Court do not fall in
any of the grounds of non-registrability under article 58 of the
Decision, which establishes a precedent somehow dangerous,
since the Court is making interpretations that do not fit into the
trademark law of the Cartagena Agreement.
German Cavelier
Cavelier Abogados
Bogota, Colombia
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